Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2021

The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership, and
Systematic Risk
John C. Coffee Jr.
Columbia Law School, jcoffee@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John C. Coffee Jr., The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership, and Systematic Risk, 2021 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 602 (2021).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2680

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

COFFEE

8/20/2021 6:32 PM

THE FUTURE OF DISCLOSURE: ESG,
COMMON OWNERSHIP, AND SYSTEMATIC
RISK
John C. Coffee, Jr.*
The U.S. securities markets have recently undergone (or are
undergoing) three fundamental transitions: (1) institutionalization (with the result that institutional investors now dominate both trading and stock ownership); (2) extraordinary ownership concentration (with the consequence that the three
largest U.S. institutional investors now hold twenty percent
and vote twenty-five percent of the shares in S&P 500 companies); and (3) the introduction of ESG disclosures (which has
been driven in the U.S. by pressure from large institutional investors). In light of these transitions, how should disclosure
policy change? Do institutions and retail investors have the
same or different disclosure needs? Why are large institutions
pressing for increased ESG disclosures?
This Article will focus on the desire of institutions for
greater ESG disclosures and suggest that two reasons underlie
this demand for more information: (1) ESG disclosures overlap
substantially with systematic risk, which is the primary concern of diversified investors; and (2) high common ownership
enables institutions to take collective action to curb externalities caused by portfolio firms, so long as the gains to their portfolio from such action exceed the losses caused to the externality-creating firms. This transition to a portfolio-wide
perspective (both in voting and investment decisions) has significant implications but also is likely to provoke political controversy. In its final hours, the Trump Administration adopted
new rules that discourage voting based on ESG criteria and
thus by extension chill ESG investing. This controversy will
continue.

* Professor Coffee is the Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia
University Law School and Director of its Center on Corporate Governance.
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As more institutions shift to portfolio-wide decisionmaking,
there is an optimistic upside: externalities may be curbed by
collective shareholder action. For entirely rational reasons, the
new “universal” shareholders who now dominate the market
will resist even large public companies who might seek to impose externalities on other companies. Owning the market, the
“universal” shareholder will protect the market. Still, this process of resistance may produce frictions, and the disclosure
needs of individual investors and institutional investors will
increasingly diverge. Of course, not all institutional investors
are indexed or even diversified, but those that remain undiversified (for example, hedge funds) logically have the perspective
of an option-holder and favor greater risk-taking. Across the
board, retail investors have different perspectives and preferences than do institutional investors.
Above all, the combination of high common ownership and
institutional sensitivity to systematic risk makes disclosure a
far more powerful force. If disclosure was once Brandeis’s best
disinfectant, it is now becoming a force that can effect significant social and economic change without the need for judicial
or agency intervention.
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INTRODUCTION

How should the norms of corporate governance and disclosure policy change (at the SEC and elsewhere) in light of new
market conditions and a changing population of shareholders?
So framed, this may seem a fairly narrow question, which assumes that one accepts the need for a mandatory disclosure
system.1 Yet, once over that first hurdle, a second question
logically follows that is broader and more nuanced: Do all investors have the same informational needs and goals? Or do
some have distinctive needs and preferences? This Article will
suggest that individual and institutional investors have different needs (largely based on their level of diversification)
and that conflicts can arise between them.
Diversified institutional investors are beginning to make
voting and investment decisions on a portfolio-wide basis instead of on a stock-by-stock basis. This is a product of the
growth in indexed investing and the high level of common
ownership among such indexed investors, but it implies in
turn that we may be moving from a system of corporate governance that is premised on a “shareholder primacy model” to
a system that is premised on a “portfolio primacy model.”2 In
the future, our largest institutions may knowingly accept, and
even cause, losses at some firms in their portfolios if they

1 Because this topic has been debated at length elsewhere, it will be
sidestepped here. For defenses of a mandatory disclosure system, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 *1984) (finding such a system
is a cost-effective subsidy and produces positive externalities); Merritt B.
Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Disclosure Is
Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999).
2 This idea of a “portfolio primacy model” should not be confused with
a “stakeholder primacy model,” which has been supported by many commentators who want boards and managers to balance the interest of other
stakeholders in the corporation with those of shareholders. A focus on maximizing the value of the portfolio is quite different from a focus on sustainability or wealth transfers to stakeholders (even though the two perspectives may overlap).
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expect that those losses will be outweighed by correlative
gains at other portfolio firms.
One cannot assess this topic without recognizing that we
have moved far away from the environment in which the SEC
grew up. In fact, three distinct and important transitions are
in progress, but each is at a very different stage.
First and most obvious, the “institutionalization” of the
market has now been fully realized. Historically, the SEC has
always seen its interests as closely aligned with those of the
retail investor.3 It has proclaimed itself “the investors’ advocate,”4 and public investors have in turn recognized and applauded the SEC’s efforts. This mutual alliance gave the SEC
relative political immunity and assured it reasonable budgetary appropriations, despite major swings in policy and times
of great stress for other agencies over recent decades.5
3

For this conclusion, see generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFOR-

MATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE

(3d ed. 2003).
Professor Donald Langevoort opens an excellent article dealing with
the transition from a retail to an institutional market (and its implications
for the SEC) by observing correctly in his first sentence: “The Securities and
Exchange Commission thinks of itself as the investors’ advocate[.]” Donald
C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1025 (2009). This phrase also appears regularly on the SEC’s website. See, e.g., Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee
Meeting (Mar. 8, 2018) (quoting William O. Douglas, Chairman, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Dinner of the Association of Stock Exchange Firms at the Commodore Hotel 3 (May 20, 1938)),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-stein-2018-3-8
[https://perma.cc/MZ8F-6J44].
5 I do not mean that the SEC always got what it wanted (or needed),
but in comparison to other “consumer protection” agencies, including the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission and the more recent Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, it has done relatively well. See SELIGMAN, supra note 3, at xviii–xxi (discussing the twentieth century). I attribute this
not to uniformly brilliant leadership at the SEC, but to the fact that Congress knows the SEC is popular with individual investors (and voters) in
their jurisdiction. Cf. Harvey J. Goldschmid, Keynote Address, The SEC at
70: Let’s Celebrate Its Reinvigorated Golden Years, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
825, 831–33 (2005) (defending the SEC’s responsiveness to public concerns).
Here, it is also noteworthy that institutional investors do not vote.
4
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But that is past. The era in which retail investors “owned”
companies or moved the trading markets is long gone and
“deader than disco.” Today, retail investors account for only a
modest minority of the ownership of large, publicly traded
companies and probably only around 4% of the trading in
NYSE-listed companies.6 Stock ownership is now dominated
by institutional investors, who are increasingly diversified
and often indexed.7
The second transition involves the more recent and extraordinary concentration in stock ownership, with the result
that as few as five to ten institutions today may be in a
6 The level of institutional ownership increases with the size of the company’s market capitalization (as institutions desire liquidity and thus concentrate on large cap stocks). Thus, if we look at the market value of all
outstanding, publicly traded equity securities in the United States, institutions have owned over 62% for a number of years. See KATIE KOLCHIN &
JUSTYNA PODZIEMISKA, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N., 2019 CAPITAL MARKETS FACT BOOK 73 tbl.U.S. Holdings of Equities (2019) (percentages ranged
between 64.7% and 62.4% from 2008 to 2018). If, however, we look at the
U.S. companies that are among the 10,000 largest companies in the world,
this percentage rises to 72% according to a recent OECD report. ADRIANA
DE LA CRUZ, ALEJANDRA MEDINA & YUNG TANG, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. &
DEV., OWNERS OF THE WORLD’S LISTED COMPANIES 11 tbl. 3 (2019).
For the level of trading in publicly listed equities by retail investors, a
recent estimate is 3.68% (based on data from 2010 to 2015). See Ekkehart
Boehmer et al., Tracking Retail Investor Activity, J. FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 8) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2822105. For an earlier estimate of 2% for trading by individual investors, see Alicia Davis Evans, A
Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2009). In 2020,
the percentage of trading by retail investors saw some increase as the result
of market strategies adopted by Robinhood Markets, Inc. and other online
brokers, but it remains to be seen whether this is more than a short-term
phenomenon. See Caitlin McCabe, Retail Investors Pull Back Trading Activity, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2021, at A1.
7 “Indexing,” or “indexed investing” refers to a passive investment
strategy under which the investor invests in a broad market index (such as,
for example, the S&P 500 index), seeking not to outperform the market, but
only to match it. As later discussed, much empirical research strongly suggests that retail investors cannot outperform the market and that they lose
money systematically when they attempt to do so. Indexed investing also
reduces trading costs, as it is a “buy and hold” policy, which can minimize
tax liabilities.
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position to exercise de facto control over even large public corporations. The Big Three institutional investors—BlackRock,
Inc., State Street Global Advisors, and the Vanguard Group—
now hold over 20% of the shares in S&P 500 companies, vote
approximately 25%, and are projected to vote over 40% by
2038.8 Potentially, this might suggest that retail investors are
exposed to domination by institutional control groups,9 but
such a thesis still seems premature. At first glance, little conflict is apparent between diversified institutions and retail

8 This difference between 20% and 25% reflects the fact that many
shares are not voted. For these percentages and for their prediction that the
votes cast by the Big Three will rise eventually to 40% or more, see Lucian
Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721,
724 (2019). To give an example of activism in action, just six shareholders
control 24% of ExxonMobil; the same six control 26% of Chevron; and they
have pressured both companies regarding emissions and climate change.
Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV.
1, 10–11, 24 & n.116 (2020). These six included the foregoing Big Three and
Northern Trust, Bank of America, and Capital Research Global Investors.
Id. at 10 n.38. The stock in publicly held companies (in terms of asset values)
that is held by the ten largest mutual funds (not all of which are index
funds) rose from 46% in 2005 to 64% in 2019, and the corresponding percentages held by the five largest such funds grew from 35% in 2005 to 53%
in 2019. See INV. CO. INST., INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK 46, fig.2.14
(60th ed. 2020).
9 Much of the literature that is concerned about the growing concentration of shares in the hands of a limited number of institutional owners has
focused on the danger that such concentration will be anticompetitive, leading to shareholder pressure in some industries for firms not to compete. See
Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1268–69
(2016); José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects
of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513, 1514 (2018). However, the flip side
of this coin is that institutions can use their collective power to induce their
portfolio companies to behave in a more socially responsible manner (at
least when it will benefit their portfolio on a net basis). In particular, concentrated owners can balance the gains caused to some companies in their
portfolio by shareholder activism that restricts or discourages externalities
that injure them against the losses experienced by the externality-causing
firms in the same portfolio. Although it cannot be assumed that the potential gains will necessarily exceed the potential losses, when they do, it is
good business policy to force the internalization of the externalities by the
firms causing them. See Condon, supra note 8, at 10–11.
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investors, as indexed institutions are not seeking control.10
Still, a potential conflict may be developing: as diversified institutional investors, utilizing their power of common ownership, begin to make decisions on a portfolio-wide basis (deliberately pursuing strategies that boost the stocks of some firms
in their portfolios, while depressing the stocks of others to
achieve a net gain), they will be taking actions contrary to the
interests of undiversified investors in those firms on which
they impose losses. Eventually, this conflict will trigger controversy and may necessitate compromises.
Meanwhile, retail investors have moved their investments
from “actively managed” (or “stock-picking”) mutual funds to
more passive index funds.11 Collectively, retail investors seem
to have finally recognized that they are poor stock pickers who
systematically lose money when they trade actively on their
own.12 As a result, they have migrated in large numbers to
invest in highly diversified institutional intermediaries (led
by the Big Three), thereby further increasing ownership concentration.13

10 For a discussion of constraints on institutional control, see Jill Fisch,
Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street:
A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 61–64
(2019).
11 In 2019, index funds (i.e., mutual funds that track a broad market
index) for the first time exceeded traditional stock-picking funds, holding
$4.27 trillion in assets as compared to $4.25 trillion for traditional stockpicking funds. Dawn Lin, Index Funds Are The New Kings Of Wall Street,
WALL ST. J., (Sept. 18, 2019, 5:30 AM) (on file with the Columbia Business
Law Review), https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-the-new-kingsof-wall-street-11568799004; see also generally Fisch et al., supra note 10.
12 The simple truth is that only a small minority of actively managed
funds have outperformed passive index funds. In his Presidential Address
to the American Economics Association, Professor Kenneth R. French assembled data showing that, over the period from 1980 to 2006, a passive
investor would have on average beaten an actively-trading investor by over
sixty-seven basis points per year. Kenneth R. French, Presidential Address,
The Cost of Active Investing, 63 J. FIN. 1537, 1561 (2008).
13 While the Big Three now hold over 20%, some estimate that they will
hold 40% or more of the shares in the S&P 500 within two decades. See
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 8, at 740 fig.3, 741.
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Finally, the third important transition involves a new demand among investors (particularly among diversified institutional investors) for a new category of information, known
as “ESG” disclosures (ESG is an acronym that stands for “environmental, social, and governance”).14 Investors who pursue
“ESG investing” tend to focus heavily on the environmental
and social impact of the firm and on its human capital (including the level of racial and gender diversity at the firm).15 Although it may be clear why social activists want to encourage
such socially relevant disclosures, it puzzles many why diversified institutional investors have been the strongest proponents of increased ESG disclosure.16 This Article argues that
this development is neither strange nor the product of the political sympathies of individual fund managers, but is the consequence of a fundamental economic logic. Put simply, their
interest in ESG disclosures flows directly both from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)17 and from the just-noted fact
14 Many believe that trustees and other fiduciaries “have come under
increasing pressure to use environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors in their investment decisions.” See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H.
Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and
Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 384 (2020).
Although there may be pressure (particularly in the case of public pension
funds, which are politically accountable), this Article will assert that sound
economic reasons better explain why fiduciaries at large diversified investors favor ESG principles, and thus why ESG investing is likely to increase
for reasons unrelated to political pressure. Interestingly, journalists report
that while European oil companies have been pressured by their governments to incorporate ESG criteria into their decisionmaking, the pressure
on U.S. oil companies for the same outcome has come exclusively from large
institutional investors (and not at all from the government). See Stanley
Reed, Europe’s Oil Titans Ramp up Transition to Cleaner Energy, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2020, at B1.
15 For a similar description of ESG investing, see Schanzenbach &
Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 388.
16 Anecdotal evidence is abundant that diversified institutional investors, including the Big Three, are placing significant pressure on many companies, particularly including energy companies to expedite their dates for
“carbon-neutrality” and on all companies to achieve greater board diversity.
See generally Condon, supra note 8; Reed, supra note 14.
17 For the original statement of this model, see generally William F.
Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under
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of their high common ownership in portfolio companies. Both
of these factors imply that diversified investors should rationally concentrate on systematic risk and generally disregard
idiosyncratic risk. Indeed, the best evidence that these diversified investors are conforming to economic logic lies in a new
pattern under which they are actively voting and lobbying
public companies in common, primarily on ESG-related issues.18
Given high common ownership across a broad portfolio, it
becomes rational and predictable that diversified institutional
investors will increasingly make both investment and voting
decisions on a portfolio-wide basis (rather than simply trying
to maximize the value of individual stocks). Proposals made
by a diversified institutional investor to the firms in its portfolio will likely produce some winners and some losers, particularly for proposals relating to climate change and other ESG
issues. If netting these gains and losses produces a positive
result, the indexed investor profits in a way that the undiversified investor cannot duplicate. These opportunities are most
likely to arise with respect to ESG issues. The implications of
this strategy are sweeping, controversial, and possibly as adverse to the interests of retail investors as they are advantageous to the interests of large diversified investors.19
How should the SEC respond (if at all) to these transitions?
Some will argue that the SEC should keep the protection of
Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964); John Lintner, The Valuation of
Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and
Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT. 13 (1965).
18 See generally Elroy Dimson, Oğuzhan Karakaş & Xi Li, Coordinated
Engagements (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper No. 721/2021,
Jan. 2021) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3209072 (finding an “international network of
long-term shareholders cooperating to influence firms on environmental
and social issues”).
19 What is new here is that large institutional investors can profit by
deliberately causing losses to some firms in their portfolios if doing so results in greater gains to other firms in their portfolio. Although non-controlling shareholders have never owed a duty of loyalty to the corporations in
which they invest, it is hard to think of any comparable instance in which
causing losses to some fellow shareholders could benefit them.
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the retail investor as its first priority, but this Article is premised on the belief that the migration of retail investors to indexed investing has been salutary. In fact, the SEC should encourage (and even gently push) retail investors to diversify,
shifting their retirement savings to diversified (and, generally, indexed) institutional intermediaries (i.e., mutual funds
and pension funds). Still, this preference leaves unanswered
our initial question: How do the informational needs of institutional investors and retail investors differ? How should the
SEC respond to their differing needs?
This question has been approached by others but not directly answered. A dozen years ago, Professor Donald Langevoort focused on the transition from retail to institutional
markets at the time of the SEC’s seventy-fifth anniversary. 20
His recommendations seemed to suggest that the U.S. market
would probably become more like the European securities
market, which, as he accurately observed, was characterized
by (1) “light touch” enforcement, (2) a lesser disclosure burden
emphasizing principles-based disclosure, and (3) considerably
less reliance on ex post litigation to enforce disclosure
norms.21 Others challenged him,22 but the greater problem
with Professor Langevoort’s thesis was his unfortuitous timing. Shortly after he wrote, the 2008 financial crisis broke,
and, in response, even the United Kingdom abandoned “light
touch” regulation. While differences in enforcement intensity
still separate the United States and Europe (and will likely

20
21
22

See Langevoort, supra note 4.
See id. at 1032–42.
See generally Evans, supra note 6.
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continue),23 a greater consensus exists today over the need for
stronger enforcement24 and a mandatory disclosure system.25
This Article will therefore skirt the topic of enforcement
and instead focus on where the disclosure needs of retail and
institutional investors may differ and where they are not being addressed. Here, other transitions in securities law practices are also relevant. Increasingly, private offerings, which
are exempt from the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”),
have come to rival public offerings as a means for issuers to
raise capital. Indeed, in recent years the number of private
offerings and the total capital raised in them has exceeded the
corresponding figures for public offerings subject to the 1933
Act.26 Because these exempt offerings require little disclosure
(at least as a legal matter),27 this might seem to imply that
23 For a detailed examination of relative enforcement intensity between
the U.S., the U.K., and Europe, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and
the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229 (2007).
24 See, e.g., generally Hans B. Christensen, Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz,
Mandatory IFRS Reporting and Changes in Enforcement, 56 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 147 (2013) (emphasizing the link between enforcement quality and
liquidity benefits); see also Coffee, supra note 23.
25 See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, Mandatory Disclosure in Primary
Markets, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 1069, 1072 (observing, despite objections to the
consensus, that “[n]early all scholars support” mandatory disclosure).
26 The principal exemption for private placements is Regulation D. 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.500–.08 (2020). The number of “Reg D” offerings has exceeded
the number of public equity offerings by a thirty-to-one margin. See JOHN
C. COFFEE, JR., HILLARY A. SALE & M. TODD HENDERSON, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 368 tbl.Number of Offerings by Type of Offering and Year (13th ed. 2015). The aggregate amount raised in private markets has also exceeded that raised in public markets in some years. For
example, in 2012, $1.7 trillion was raised in private markets versus $1.2
trillion in public markets in registered offerings. Id. at 368.
27 Under Rule 502(b) of Regulation D, the issuer need not provide information to purchasers when selling to “accredited investors.” 17 C.F.R. §
230.502(b). Typically, such offerings are, as a result, limited to “accredited
investors,” which term is defined in Rule 501 of Regulation D to require only
a modest $1 million net worth or an annual income for the two most recent
years equal to or exceeding $200,000. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6). With
inflation, this test has become much more permissive and now includes millions of investors. As a generalization, the purchasers in Reg D offerings are
generally individuals and smaller institutions, and the disclosure they
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institutional investors need less information. Yet a confounding fact interferes with this simple conclusion: the character
of the disclosure actually provided in offerings done pursuant
to Rule 144A (the exemption from registration preferred by
large public issuers)28 closely resembles the character of the
information in a registration statement filed pursuant to the
1933 Act. In particular, the issuer’s disclosures in a Rule 144A
offering typically follow the same standardized format. Although no precise metric exists that proves that the same
quantum of information is present in both exempt and registered offerings, institutional investors as a group appear to
want (and implicitly demand) at least the same information
as other investors, and they prefer it presented in the same
standardized format. Particularly as they come to make decisions on a portfolio-wide basis, diversified institutions will increasingly want to know and compare the likely impact of
ESG-related policy changes on all firms in their portfolio. In
contrast, undiversified shareholders, lacking common ownership, are not in a position to make similar inquiries or implement similar portfolio-wide policies.
This Article will offer a number of conclusions that are
brief and blunt; to be brief, it is necessary to be blunt. Organizationally, Part II of this Article will focus on the informational needs of institutional investors (and particularly the
fully diversified institutions). How do their needs and priorities differ from those of the retail individual investor? Relying
receive tends to be quite modest. Cf. SCOTT BAUGUESS, RACHITA GULLAPALLI
& VLADIMIR IVANOV, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS,
2009-2017, at 34 tbl.11 (finding an average of fourteen investors per Regulation D offering from 2009 to 2017).
28 See Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A. This rule permits private sales
to institutional buyers that own and invest at least $100 million in securities of unrelated issuers (in short, the profile of a large institutional investor). Id. § 230.144A(a)–(c). The volume and quality of the disclosure in Rule
144A offerings is much higher than in Reg D offerings to smaller investors,
suggesting that large institutions are demanding more information based
on their market power. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Do the Securities Laws
Matter? The Rise of the Leveraged Loan Market, 39 J. CORP. L. 725, 766–67
(2014).
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on the CAPM, it will suggest, first, that institutional investors
are more concerned with “systematic risk” than are individual
investors29 and, second, that ESG disclosures address systematic risk to a much greater degree than the SEC has recognized.
Part III will then return to the individual retail investor,
who certainly remains on the scene and is the dominant investor in smaller companies that offer less liquidity. What
new needs (and fears) might the retail investor reasonably
have in the contemporary investment environment? Here, a
partial answer will be that, although diversified institutions
tend to be tolerant of risk, individual investors rationally have
the reverse preference.
Finally, Part IV will turn to the growth of ESG disclosures.
Although such disclosures are now becoming mandatory in
Europe, they remain optional and voluntary in the United
States, with the SEC having stubbornly avoided (at least prior
to the Biden administration) taking any firm (or even coherent) position on ESG disclosures.30 This Article seeks both to

29 The claim here is not that individual investors disregard or ignore
systematic risk, but that they are unable to do much about it. Lacking high
common ownership, they cannot take meaningful collective action. Although portfolio firms may face different degrees of systematic risk, the retail investor also has choices with regard to a vast range of companies with
differing idiosyncratic risks and thus have less reason to focus disproportionately on systematic risk.
30 The SEC has not implemented any mandatory ESG disclosure requirements, leaving them entirely voluntary. For a critical evaluation of the
SEC’s positions, see Thomas Lee Hazen, Social Issues in the Spotlight: The
Increasing Need To Improve Publicly-Held Companies’ CSR and ESG Disclosures, 23 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 6–7) (on file
with the Columbia Business Law Review), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id= 3615327.
Nonetheless, it is abundantly clear that the SEC, under the Biden administration and new Chairman Gary Gensler, has made the promulgation of
ESG disclosure standards a priority. For a recent overview, predicting that
new ESG standards will appear in 2021, see K&L Gates LLP, SEC To Move
Quickly on ESG Disclosures, JD SUPRA (May 17, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/sec-to-move-quickly-on-proposed-esg-9700856/
[https://perma.cc/YKJ5-FJBA]. This Article will not attempt to assess rules
that have not yet been drafted.
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explain the strong interest of diversified institutions in ESG
disclosures and the obstacles that exist under current law to
the use of such information by certain fiduciaries. This leads
to a final question: How should the SEC assist, encourage, or
otherwise influence this process?

II. THE INFORMATIONAL NEEDS OF THE
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR:
HOW ARE THEY DIFFERENT?
It is traditional to begin any discussion that relies on “law
and economics” with the mandatory observation that “one size
does not fit all.” Not all institutional investors are alike. Some
mutual funds and many hedge funds are “stock pickers;” they
engage in active trading and believe they can outperform the
efficient market. Generally, they are wrong,31 but not invariably (which could be explained by the fact that some may have
access to private information). Today, highly diversified institutional investors have more assets under their management
than do institutions engaged in “actively managed” stock picking.32 Typically these highly diversified investors do not attempt to outperform the market, but rather to mirror it
cheaply.33
Given their dominance, it is prudent to ask: What kinds of
information does the fully diversified investor want? Here, one
needs to turn to the CAPM, and its most relevant teaching for
our purposes is that diversification reduces “idiosyncratic”
risk but not “systematic” risk.34 Idiosyncratic risk (or non-systematic risk) is the risk that is unique to a company or industry; for example, a company’s (or an industry’s) technology
may be outdated or outperformed by a new emerging technology (e.g., natural gas or solar power may become cheaper than
See supra note 12.
See supra note 11.
33 For a discussion of index investing and its possibilities, see Byung
Hyun Ahn, Jill E. Fisch, Panos N. Patatoukas & Steven Davidoff Solomon,
Synthetic Governance, 2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 476.
34 For a concise discussion of this difference in the standard finance
textbook, see RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 178–81 (13th ed. 2020).
31
32

COFFEE

616

8/20/2021 6:32 PM

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2021

oil- or coal-based power). But some risks affect all companies:
inflation may increase; a banking crisis may disrupt finance
and cut off credit across the economy; or, more recently, a pandemic may require all companies to curtail or suspend operations. Diversification does not offer satisfactory protection
from these risks.
The CAPM assumes that the capital markets ignore nonsystematic risk in pricing the value of a financial asset (including corporate stock) because diversified investors do not
bear that risk.35 Because diversification is easily achieved
with little cost or effort for investors, the price of a stock, according to this model, is set by diversified investors, who need
only consider the company’s systematic risk. In effect, if two
companies have the same expected return, the fact that one
has higher non-systematic risk will not affect their relative
valuation to the extent the market price is set by diversified
investors who do not bear this risk. Put differently, investors
cannot demand a higher return for bearing non-systematic
risk that they could have easily diversified away.
The key implication here is that the price of a financial asset will be determined by the asset’s systematic risk compared
to the risk of the market as a whole. To be sure, the CAPM
has been much criticized and may overstate its case.36 But,
even its critics believe that it points in the right direction and
is roughly accurate.37 The CAPM’s immediate implication for
our topic of disclosure policy is that, as the market becomes
increasingly populated by diversified investors, these investors will focus primarily on systematic risk. Individual investors may have some concern about systematic risk, but it does
not dominate their intentions because there is little they can

Id. at 207.
For such a critique, see Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 3,
4–5 (1993) (finding the CAPM to be empirically inadequate).
37 In a series of articles, Fama and French proposed supplementing the
original CAPM with a few additional factors. See generally Eugene F. Fama
& Kenneth R. French, A Five-Factor Asset Pricing Model, 116 J. FIN. ECON.
1 (2015). Thus, although they believe the CAPM needs to be supplemented,
they do not reject it as a starting point.
35
36
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do about it, and they have a range of other choices. Unsurprisingly, the SEC, as an agency that has always served the retail
investor, has never addressed systematic risk in anything approaching a comprehensive manner.38
Let us assume that the CAPM makes assumptions that
many will regard as overstated.39 Even if we need to take it
with a substantial grain of salt, the CAPM still legitimately
implies that the SEC needs to modernize its disclosure policy
and focus more seriously on systematic risk. This does not
mean that the SEC should ignore non-systematic risk (because many investors will remain less than fully diversified),
but it does suggest that diversified investors, who constitute
a majority of the market, have an unmet disclosure need.
What has the SEC done to this point with regard to ESG
disclosures? The short answer is very little. In 2018, institutional investors representing over $5 trillion in assets under
management submitted a rulemaking petition to the SEC requesting it to mandate ESG disclosure standards for public
companies.40 “[M]ore than 60 governments and international
[organizations], including the United Nations . . . [and] the International Organization of Securities Commissions,” have
promulgated ESG standards,41 but the SEC has resisted these
pressures (probably motivated by countervailing pressures
from corporate issuers). The SEC’s principal expressed concern has been the danger of information overload that would
inundate investors with low-quality information and often inconsistent metrics and rankings.42 To date, the SEC’s only
38 For a discussion of some of the pressures against comprehensive regulation of systematic risk from the financial sector, see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 818–22 (2011).
39 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
40 For a fuller description, see Virginia Harper Ho & Stephen Kim
Park, ESG Disclosure in Comparative Perspective: Optimizing Private Ordering in Public Reporting, 41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 249, 253 (2019).
41 Id. at 252–54 (footnotes omitted).
42 For an evaluation of this danger and an answer to it, see generally
Virginia Harper Ho, Disclosure Overload?: Lessons for Risk Disclosure and
ESG Reporting in the Regulation S-K Concept Release, 65 VILL. L. REV. 67
(2020).
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real action has been to update its standards under Regulation
S-K (which specifies the disclosures mandated in SEC filings),43 but here it has limited itself to extremely general
“principles-based disclosures.”44 Meanwhile, the largest U.S.
institutional investors (including the Big Three) have gone
well beyond adopting general policies and have directly engaged major companies on climate change issues and have
even sued them.45

17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1–.1406 (2020).
In 2020, the SEC “modernized” its requirements with respect to
Items 101, 103 and 105 of Regulation S-K but required only very general
“principles-based” disclosures. For example, with respect to Item 101 (which
requires a description of the issuer’s business), it did address the “social”
component of ESG, but only in a minimal way by instructing issuers to provide:
43
44

A description of the registrant’s human capital resources, including the number of persons employed by the registrant,
and any human capital measures or objectives that the registrant focuses on in managing the business (such as, depending on the registrant’s business and workforce,
measures or objectives that address the development, attraction and retention of personnel).
Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, 85 Fed. Reg.
63,726, 63,760 (Oct. 8, 2020) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt 229). This brief statement was the SEC’s only reference in this release to the goals of diversity
and affirmative action. Thus, although Item 101 now at last addresses the
social component of ESG, it does so only in a minimal way. Not surprisingly,
some observers have reported that more investors are concerned about “the
under-disclosure of material information” about human capital, not overdisclosure. See Ho, supra note 42, at 73–75 (emphasis deleted).
45 For a description of a forceful intervention by a group of six large
institutional shareholders (including the Big Three) that succeeded in causing both ExxonMobil and Chevron to support climate change reforms that
these firms had previously opposed, see Condon, supra note 8, at 25. Not
only are broadly diversified institutions seeking more ESG disclosures, they
are also acting upon them as well, sometimes by suing portfolio companies.
See Alexander I. Platt, Index Fund Enforcement, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1453,
1458–59 (2020). In contrast, diversified investors would be wasting their
funds to seek to improve or mitigate idiosyncratic risks. For example, if they
sought to improve operating performance at Ford, the resulting gains, if
any, might only be offset by a stock decline at GM, which would lose market
share to Ford.
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This activism of diversified institutional investors on ESG
issues contrasts sharply with their general passivity on firmspecific business issues, and this disparity can only be explained in one way: diversified institutional investors are
deeply concerned about whether the market is accurately incorporating climate-change-related risks into asset prices. 46
Although diversified investors are generally indifferent to idiosyncratic risks (from which diversification protects them),
they have little defense against systematic risk.
Climate change probably presents the clearest example of
systematic risk. Although it will not affect all companies the
same (i.e., the risk is heterogeneous), investors cannot escape
it through diversification. That is, there is no obvious class of
companies whose stock will go up as the result of global warming so as to compensate diversified investors for those other
stocks that go down.
Given that they are unavoidably exposed to this risk, diversified investors rationally want disclosures that enable
them to estimate its impact on their portfolios. Further, they
may want to take actions (either by voting, litigation, or persuasion) to induce changes that reduce such risk even if they
cause losses to some companies in their portfolio—so long as
the action taken implies greater gains than losses to their
portfolio. A clear indication of this new activism came in
46 For the view that the market is not doing this and a careful specification of the reasons why it tends to misprice climate-related and ESG risks,
see generally Madison Condon, Market Myopia’s Climate Bubble, UTAH L.
REV. (forthcoming 2021) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782675. Diversified institutions have less concern about whether the market is mispricing information relating to idiosyncratic risk. Not only are these institutions unable to analyze all their
portfolio companies in detail, but even if they discovered mispricing of firmspecific information and sought to exploit it, it is not clear that such efforts
would benefit them on a portfolio-wide basis. For example, if activists convinced an index fund that Ford should be pressured to sell a marginally
profitable division (and Ford did so under pressure, thereby increasing its
market share and stock price), it does not follow that this effort would necessarily benefit the index fund, as the market share gained by Ford might
only be lost by General Motors, another portfolio company of the index fund.
In short, from the portfolio-wide perspective, this was only a zero-sum transfer which required the index fund to incur some transactional costs.
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January 2021, when BlackRock’s CEO, Larry Fink, wrote to
the CEOs of major public corporations asking them to commit
to a “goal of net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.”47
This is a costly change that will adversely impact earnings at
many companies, but it seems intended to benefit other firms
in BlackRock’s portfolio even more, and thus may result in a
net benefit for BlackRock.48
Another example of a systematic risk that has concerned
institutional investors and the SEC involves the COVID-19
pandemic. Here, the SEC has been actively seeking increased
disclosure, asking all public companies to explain how the
pandemic is affecting them.49 Obviously, pandemics represent
a form of systematic risk because diversification again cannot
protect an institution’s portfolio.
Although the examples of climate change and a pandemic
are clear, skeptics may respond that not all ESG disclosure
relates to systematic risk. For example, ESG disclosures often
focus on racial diversity and inclusiveness. Skeptics may
doubt that such disclosures relate at all to systematic risk disclosure. Yet, over the long run, these disclosures arguably relate to the potential viability of our corporate system. If our
corporate system cannot offer inclusiveness and promote diversity, it may subject itself to a political risk that capitalism
(or, at least, contemporary corporate governance) will be
See Larry Fink, Letter to CEOs, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERN(Jan. 30, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/01/30/letter-toceos/ [https://perma.cc/8Q6D-8KXY]. This letter went on to describe several
metrics that BlackRock would use in evaluating whether their portfolio
companies were in compliance and a “heightened-scrutiny model” that its
actively-managed funds would use in dealing with non-complying portfolio
companies. Id.
48 See id.
49 There has been a continuing stream of SEC statements since March
2020. See Coronavirus (COVID-19)—Disclosure Considerations Regarding
Operations, Liquidity, and Capital Resources, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/covid-19-disclosure-considerations
[https://perma.cc/CD4M-LZDM] (last modified June 23, 2020). For a brief
overview, see Frank Lopez et al., Updating Publicly Traded Company Disclosures for COVID-19, LAW360 (Mar. 20, 2020, 5:47 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1253913/updating-publicly-traded-company-disclosures-for-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/2XW4-6HWA].
47

ANCE
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politically challenged and could conceivably yield to a more
state-run system of corporate governance. To some degree,
such a transition seems to be already occurring in Europe and
the United Kingdom.50 Again, diversification could not adequately protect investors against this risk of political upheaval, which could directly threaten the traditional investor’s goal of shareholder wealth maximization.
One last point about “systematic risk” needs to be underscored: for diversified investors, systematic risk overlaps
heavily with securities law’s bedrock concept of materiality.
Because systematic risks cannot be diversified away by investors, information about such risks is more material to diversified investors than information about “idiosyncratic” risks,
both because institutional investors are in theory exposed
only to “systematic risk” and because they (and, as a practical
matter, only they) may be able to take corrective action to minimize such risk.51 Indeed, as later discussed, the major
50 Nations can be located on a corporate governance continuum ranging
from “shareholder-centric” systems (of which the United States is the leading example) to “stakeholder-centric” systems (into which category most European nations fall). See Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a StakeholderShareholder Theory of Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7
HASTINGS BUS L.J. 309, 309–11 (2011). In Europe and the United Kingdom,
there has been recent movement towards increasing the rights of, and duties owed to, stakeholders. One step in this direction has been the recent
popularity of “stewardship codes” for investors. See Jennifer G. Hill, Good
Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 497, 497–98 (2018); Jennifer G. Hill, Shifting Contours of
Directors’ Fiduciary Duties and Norms in Comparative Corporate Governance, 5 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L, TRANSNAT’L & COMPAR. L. 163, 175–78 (2020);
Jackson, supra, at 387–89.
51 For discussions of the magnitude of climate change as a leading systematic risk and investors’ concerns about it, see INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE
LEADERSHIP, UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE, UNHEDGEABLE RISK: HOW CLIMATE
CHANGE SENTIMENT IMPACTS INVESTMENT 5 (2015); Stefano Battison et al.,
A Climate Stress-Test of the Financial System, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE
283, 288 (2017). For our purposes, “materiality” is defined for the federal
securities laws in remarkably broad language, which was set forth in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (“[A]n omitted fact is material if
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976))).
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diversified institutions have begun to take direct action on a
coordinated basis (through litigation, proxy fights, or the
threat of exit).52
Ultimately, the informational needs of the diversified institutional investor depend on the role that it is willing to assume. For some time, commentators have presented the diversified investor as being “rationally reticent” and willing to act
only on issues framed and presented by non-diversified activist investors.53 Understandable as this view was, it no longer
conforms with the current reality in which the Big Three (and
others) are taking a leadership role in pressing portfolio companies for systematic risk-related changes. BlackRock, for example, showed little “reticence” in insisting that its portfolio
companies adopt a “net zero” emissions policy by 2050. Thus,
it is necessary to recognize that, within the boundaries set by
systematic risk, indexed investors can indeed be activists—
even (because of their greater scale) potentially more effective
activists than the hedge funds.

III. THE RETAIL INVESTOR: THE RELEVANCE OF
OPTION PRICING THEORY AND COMMON
OWNERSHIP
Two different conflicts are arising between institutional
and retail shareholders, which have not been recognized or
addressed by existing SEC policy.

A. Activism and Option Pricing Theory
Institutional and individual investors recurrently disagree
over an important issue of business policy. Specifically,
In short, if reasonable investors generally want the information, it becomes
presumptively material. My premise here is only that mega-sized institutional investors (such as the Big Three) are objectively reasonable.
52 See infra Section IV.C.
53 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Cost of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 895–96 (2013) (arguing that “activists”—such as
hedge funds—will research and frame issues, which index firms will support
without having to expend funds or effort).

COFFEE

No. 2:602]

8/20/2021 6:32 PM

THE FUTURE OF DISCLOSURE

623

institutional investors object to attempts by the corporate issuer to diversify or to hold a conglomerate-like portfolio of unrelated companies in different industries. Both because the institutional investor can easily diversify its own holdings and
because it is redundant to diversify on both the investor and
corporate levels, diversified investors want to streamline the
corporation’s portfolio of investments and sell or spin off divisions or subsidiaries that are outside the corporation’s core
line of business. From an economic perspective, only synergies
between divisions can justify a corporation in holding investments in multiple unrelated companies. Still, many individual
investors do not diversify54 and therefore do not share this
policy preference. Why do they not diversify? This presents
something of a mystery, but many investors may lack adequate resources or may prefer higher risk, or their failure may
be the product of simple ignorance. As a result, such undiversified individual investors logically benefit from corporate diversification, as it reduces the risk of the investments they
hold.
Today, activist hedge funds regularly “engage” target corporations, buying a five percent or slightly greater stake and
then seeking to pressure the target into reducing its degree of
diversification (and simultaneously increasing leverage, often
through stock buybacks).55 Generally, these campaigns produce an immediate positive stock market reaction when the
activist hedge fund crosses the five percent ownership threshold and files the mandatory Schedule 13D (which typically announces both its ownership position and its proposed plans to
reduce diversification and increase leverage).56 Although this
54 See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, The Behavior of Individual
Investors, in 2B HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1533, 1560–62
(George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2013).
55 For a detailed discussion of this pattern, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund
Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016).
56 Although an intense debate continues over the long-term impact of
hedge fund activism, a consensus exists that the filing with the SEC (usually on Schedule 13D) of a disclosure announcing that the activist has taken
a five percent (or greater) position in the stock of a publicly held company is
associated with a positive abnormal stock return. See Alon Brav et al.,
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stock price reaction suggests that shareholders as a group are
made better off by these campaigns, undiversified investors
may still be made worse off. As “buy and hold” investors,57 individual retail investors are unlikely to sell and probably will
continue to hold stocks that are now subject to higher risk at
the corporate level because of reduced diversification. Does
the increase in expected return justify this increased risk? No
simple conclusion is warranted here.58
Because the CAPM assumes that the market price of a
widely traded stock is determined by the interaction of large,
fully diversified institutional investors,59 the small retail investor will not have much impact on the stock price (even if
some such investors do sell). Because the stock price is thus
unlikely to decline (as institutional investors are happy with
this new trade-off of risk and return), these individual investors need disclosure that makes clear to them that they may
now be subject to greater risk. Arguably, if the SEC continues
its traditional policy of protecting retail investors, the SEC
should mandate disclosures that warn these investors of this
increased risk. Effectively, the SEC should use this opportunity to prod investors toward greater diversification.
Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J.
FIN. 1729, 1736–37, 1756–60 (2008). Beyond that point, empirical conclusions are contested.
57 Retail investors tend to be “buy and hold” investors (who do not trade
actively), John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1559
(2006), probably because they face higher trading costs than institutional
investors who, because they trade in volume, receive quantity discounts.
58 The taste for risk is subjective and individuals differ. Thus, although
a hypothetical five percent stock market gain might induce some (or even
most) investors to accept the increased risk associated with increased leverage or reduced diversification, it may not please all shareholders. Also, the
increased risk may not be evident to many retail shareholders (who see only
the increased stock price). This conclusion will be regarded as heresy by
neoclassical economists who assume that all shareholders favor policies that
increase the share price. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 69–71 (1991). This,
however, ignores that rational investors will focus on the risk-return ratio
and vary in their reactions.
59 See supra Part II.
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Nothing in existing disclosure rules provides for anything resembling such disclosure or such advice.
This point about the increased risk associated with hedge
fund activism needs to be generalized. The famous (and Nobel
Prize-winning) work of Fischer Black and Myron Scholes on
option pricing theory begins from their insight that, once a
public company takes on significant debt, its common stock
can be modeled (and is best understood) as an option on the
corporation’s assets.60 That is, the common stockholders collectively hold an option, which, on the maturity of the debt,
allows them either to let the corporation default on its debt
(which is the equivalent of letting their option expire) or to
pay the debt off (which is the equivalent of exercising their
option). In this view, the “real” owners of the corporation are
its debt holders, who have no choice (because the shareholders
have limited liability and cannot be held personally liable if
the firm defaults on its debt). Unlike the debtholders, the
stockholders do have the choice of (1) allowing the company to
default (and thus turning the company over to the creditors)
or (2) paying off the debt (and in effect exercising the option).
Presumably, they will make the choice that maximizes their
own interests (possibly at the expense of creditors and other
stakeholders).
The immediate relevance of this point involves the incentive effects on the option holders (i.e., the common shareholders). As option holders, they can be expected to act rationally
so as to maximize the value of their option. What does that
imply? Under the Black/Scholes model, the most important
factor in determining the value of an option is the variance in
the value of the underlying asset (here, the corporation’s assets).61 In short, the greater the variance in expected corporate returns, the greater the value of the option. This may
seem counter-intuitive, because greater variance in expected
returns is unattractive to debtholders and reduces the value
60 Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 649–50 (1973). For an accessible explanation of option pricing, see RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK,
(SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 245–57 (1993).
61 See Black & Scholes, supra note 60, at 650–52.
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of the corporation’s assets in their hands. Still, a critical insight of the option pricing model is that the common stockholders, as the holders of an option, can increase the value of
their option by increasing the variance associated with the
corporation’s assets and investments. More bluntly, this
means that by increasing the riskiness of the corporation’s investments, they benefit themselves (as the option holders) at
the expense of the corporation’s creditors and other stakeholders.
Thus, we now have a scenario for opportunism by the
shareholders: if they take on riskier investments or leverage
up the company, they gain and the creditors lose. Of course,
creditors can resist by insisting on protective covenants in
loan agreements and bond indentures, but these are in declining use.62 Even if creditors could negotiate contractual protections against increased leverage, it is much harder to prevent
their corporate borrower from otherwise taking on riskier investments or making higher-risk bets. Such restrictions would
be hard to draft and would be resisted intensely by corporate
managers because these restrictions would tie their hands,
denying them needed flexibility over an extended period.
From the standpoint of the Black/Scholes model, the behavior of activist hedge funds in seeking to reduce corporate
diversification and increase leverage (or otherwise withdraw
funds from the firm) makes perfect sense. The hedge funds are
essentially seeking to increase risk to benefit the majority of
shareholders at the expense of creditors and other stakeholders. Although the hedge funds are not themselves diversified,
they know that they will be rewarded by an immediate share
price increase if they propose an action (such as increasing
leverage or reducing diversification) that will benefit the diversified shareholders that they are serving.

62 Debt covenants became disfavored in the 1980s, and empirical surveys found that large public corporations had successfully avoided them. See
Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW.
413, 426 (1986); William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 140–42.
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Although there has been a voluminous and heated debate
over the practices and ethics of activist hedge funds,63 this debate has usually been framed in terms of whether hedge funds
have a “short-term” perspective that contrasts with the allegedly “long-term” perspective of the target corporation’s managers. This misses the larger point. Without denying that
there could be differences in the time frames favored by activist shareholders and managers,64 it is simpler (and theoretically more elegant) to focus instead on the enhanced value to
the option held by the shareholders as the result of accepting
increased risk.
Possibly, some will respond: If this desire to increase the
risk level is so obvious, why didn’t the target management do
this themselves and profit from accepting increased risk and
lesser diversification? Why have only activist hedge funds proposed this? Here, there is a simple answer: corporate managers have firm-specific human capital invested in the firm,
which they cannot easily hedge. Put more simply, shareholders hold multiple stocks, but managers have only one job.
Managers will rationally resist the risk of increased leverage
or diminished diversification because it exposes them to potential bankruptcy and the loss of their human capital. Thus,
shareholders make superior risk bearers.
Today, activist hedge funds have learned that if they propose a specific scenario for increasing risk (such as by

63 For representative positions, see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon
Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015); Coffee & Palia, supra note 55; Leo E. Strine,
Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on
Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126
YALE L.J. 1870 (2017).
64 Standard compensation formulas in the hedge fund industry (which
typically annually award hedge fund managers twenty percent or more of
the fund’s gains) do give hedge fund managers considerable reason to focus
on the short run. See Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Long-Term Bias, 2020
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 104, 133–34. Moreover, hedge fund managers are
aware that their investor clients can easily move funds to another hedge
fund if they do not deliver immediate gains. In contrast, corporate managers
are conventionally assumed to have a longer term (and more risk-averse)
perspective because of their locked-in human capital.
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following a riskier investment policy, selling off corporate assets that mainly provide unneeded diversification, or increasing leverage, buybacks, and dividends), they will find it easy
to sell this policy to institutional shareholders. This motivation to increase risk and reduce diversification did not begin
with activist hedge funds. “Bust-up” takeover bidders did the
same thing in the late 1980s.65 But these bidders were chilled
by the poison pill, state takeover laws, and judicial developments.66 The evidence is clear that activist hedge funds can
today compel target managements to negotiate their demands
and place the hedge fund’s agents on the target’s board.67
More importantly, the activist fund spends far less, fares far
better, and achieves results far more quickly than the traditional hostile bidder.68 As a result, the activist hedge fund has
largely replaced the hostile bidder, but the implications for the
undiversified retail investor remain the same: increased risk
is generally contrary to their preferences.
Although the clear winners here are diversified shareholders and activist funds, the clear losers are not only creditors,
managers and stakeholders. In addition, the undiversified retail investor is a bystander whose fate is less easily summed
up. This shareholder may sometimes win and sometimes lose,
depending upon how much risk the shareholder is willing to
65 For a contemporary discussion of these takeovers, see generally John
C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1986).
66 During the 1980s, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the validity
of the poison pill in Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346
(Del. 1985), and after Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990) it seemed (at least for a time) that the “just say no
defense” would be upheld in Delaware. Possibly as a consequence, hostile
takeovers declined following 1990, and other techniques (including hedge
fund engagement) grew. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 55, at 553, 554 &
n.24, 555–57 (tracing the rise of hedge fund activism).
67 For a fuller discussion of the tactics and success of hedge fund campaigns, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Joshua R. Mitts &
Robert E. Bishop, Activist Directors and Agency Costs: What Happens When
an Activist Director Goes on the Board?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 381, 395–408
(2019).
68 See id. (noting that the costs of activist campaigns “are growing” but
also that activists can extract private benefits from target firms).
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accept. The bottom line then is that retail shareholders are
affected much more than they realize, and they may bear more
risk than they understand or want.
How (if at all) should the SEC protect these investors? The
long-term answer may be that retail investors should be prodded (or at least encouraged) by the SEC to diversify. But the
SEC’s ability at investor education is open to doubt.69 The
public does not respond well to the government’s paternalistic
advice. To the extent that investor education falls short (as I
expect it will), the second-best policy may be to require greater
disclosure that alerts the individual investor to the risk and
dangers associated with hedge fund campaigns, reduced diversification, and increased leverage. This policy, of course,
can only be pursued on a case-by-case basis, but the end goal
should be to encourage greater diversification by retail investors.

B. Common Ownership and the Undiversified Retail
Investor
As noted earlier, BlackRock has announced that it will
push all its portfolio companies to comply with a “net zero”
emissions goal by 2050.70 For companies engaged with fossil
fuels (oil, gas, or coal), this will be a considerable challenge
that could imply a period of continuing losses (or at least
greatly reduced earnings). Nor will BlackRock’s challenge be
the only one that many companies receive with respect to climate change. Other asset managers may assert challenges on
social or governance issues (including diversity). Because indexed investors must remain invested in these indexes (as
they promised their investors that they would conform to
them), there is little possibility that these investors will “exit”
69 Unquestionably, retail investors need investor education, but it is
highly questionable that the SEC can teach this course successfully. Part of
the problem is that for every dollar spent by the SEC toward this end, far
more will be spent by mutual funds, investment advisers, and the advocates
of crowdfunding, all predicting that they can find you the next Microsoft or
Apple. More likely candidates to teach the value of diversification are the
private proponents of diversification, such as, most notably, Vanguard.
70 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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and disinvest if disappointed with the portfolio company’s response. By definition, indexed investors are there to stay, although increasingly they may have a hostile relationship with
management.
Ideally, these policies will prove profitable for the asset
managers who are asserting them, but there is every reason
to believe that undiversified retail investors will be caught between the rock and the hard place. To such investors,
BlackRock’s challenge is essentially a threat. Although political and even legal challenges to BlackRock’s strategy are possible, the immediate need is for disclosure that explains the
impact of its policy to retail investors. How much will it cost
shareholders to reduce the company’s emissions level to zero?
What actions might a BlackRock or other asset manager take
to enforce its position or discipline deviant firms?71
The SEC does not yet seem to have thought through the
kinds of disclosures that are necessary or desirable from both
sides once such an adversarial relationship develops.

IV. THE SPECIAL CASE OF ESG DISCLOSURES:
CAN FIDUCIARIES LAWFULLY USE THIS
INFORMATION?
Although the term “ESG” is of fairly recent vintage, the
concept has been around for forty years or longer.72 Still, a
paradox remains: Even if investors want ESG information,
can their fiduciaries, acting for them, make decisions based on
such criteria with regard to either investing or voting? The
problem is that some fiduciaries are legally barred from relying on ethical considerations, except under special circumstances. Conservatives have long argued that fiduciaries (and
particularly trustees subject to ERISA or common-law standards) are not permitted to rely on ethical or moral judgments
(or socially desirable goals) unless they can conclude, based on
71 Here it should be recognized that even passive asset managers, such
as BlackRock, also run actively managed firms that could exit from a noncomplying portfolio firm, thereby driving down its stock price even further.
72 For a good history of the rise of ESG investing, see Schanzenbach &
Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 395–99.
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clear evidence, that pursuit of such goals will work to the financial advantage of their beneficiaries.73 From this perspective, ESG data can be considered by fiduciaries only if they
can reasonably find that it satisfies a risk-return test that enables them to improve their portfolio’s overall risk-adjusted
return.74 But this is a more complex exercise than it initially
appears. This Part will argue that the SEC can play a useful
role in resolving this dilemma.

A. A Brief History of ESG
The idea that investors should consider the social behavior
and impact of the companies in which they invest has a long
history, and some trace it back as far as the sermons of John
Wesley, the founder of the Methodist Church, who advised his
followers that they could not ethically invest in companies
that profited from the slave trade.75 Similarly, some mutual
funds have long employed a social screen to winnow out those
companies that make anti-social products. The first such U.S.
fund, Pioneer Investments, dates to 1928 and remains in business today, continually stressing its commitment to Christian
values.76 The broader concept of socially responsible investing
(or “SRI”) flowered in the 1980s, when the issue of South African apartheid provoked a crisis and caused ethical investors
to seek to disinvest from companies that were active in South
Africa.77
Such ethical investing was always in tension with trust fiduciary law, which requires a trustee to consider only the
73 This debate can be easily traced back to the 1980s, when the key
issue involved divestment campaigns aimed at South Africa’s apartheid policies. For the conservative view that social investing was illegitimate, see
generally John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the
Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72 (1980). Professors Schanzenbach and
Sitkoff appear to be following in this tradition (with some modifications).
See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 448–53.
74 This is essentially the position of Professors Schanzenbach and
Sitkoff. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 453.
75 Id. at 392.
76 Id. at 392–93.
77 Id. at 393–95.
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interests of the beneficiary.78 This “sole interest” rule is intended to protect beneficiaries from fiduciaries who might
subordinate the beneficiaries’ financial interests to those of
political or social groups with whom the fiduciary sympathizes. Legally, the “sole interest” rule implied that the trustee had to prefer investments with superior risk-adjusted returns regardless of the social impact of the investment.
Nervous that they might run afoul of the law, many riskaverse fiduciaries shied away from SRI investing. 79
To bring SRI investing into the mainstream, something
had to be done, and clever lawyers predictably devised an answer. Conceptually, they “rebranded” SRI investing and converted it into ESG investing by asserting that consideration of
the “governance factors” associated with public corporations
would enable the fiduciary to identify superior investments
and enhance risk-adjusted return.80 By adding governance to

78 Under what is known as the “sole interest” rule, a trustee must “administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.” RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRS. § 78(1) (AM. L. INST. 2007). Under a comment to this section,
the Restatement adds that “the trustee has a duty to the beneficiaries not
to be influenced by the interests of any third person or by motives other than
the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.” Id. § 78(1) cmt. f; see also
UNIF. TR. CODE § 802(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2003). If the trustee acts based on
mixed motives, “an irrebuttable presumption of wrongdoing” arises. Daniel
Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1114–15 (1988). However, a
plaintiff will still have to prove damages, which can be a considerable hurdle.
79 One recent study surveying 310 fiduciaries found that forty-seven
percent believed that the use of ESG criteria either conflicted or might conflict with their fiduciary duty. See FI360, ESG SURVEY FOR FI360 DESIGNEES
2 (2019). For other recent studies, see Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note
14, at 385 n.7.
80 I borrow the term “rebranding” from Schanzenbach and& Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 388. A key moment in this semantic transition from SRI to
ESG came in 2005 with the release of a report sponsored by a UN working
group and prepared by the international law firm of Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer, which asserted that ESG investing was not only consistent with
the trustee’s fiduciary duties, but was “arguably required in all jurisdictions.” UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIVE, A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTEGRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE
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the mix, they argued, one not only did good (ethically), but one
also did better (financially).81 This in turn enabled law firms
to opine to their clients that ESG investing was fully compatible with the trustee’s fiduciary obligations.82 A few went even
further and suggested that consideration of ESG factors might
be mandatory.83
Necessity is often the mother of invention, and the modest
claim here advanced is merely that the need to calm the fears
of risk-averse trustees best explains the addition of “governance” factors to environmental and social ones in order to convert SRI into ESG. Whatever the motive, this rebranding
seems to have worked and has rapidly brought ESG into the
investment mainstream. As of late 2019, some 1,900 asset
managers (including some of the world’s largest) have signed
the Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI) endorsing
ESG investing;84 hundreds of ESG indexes have been published that provide ESG ratings on individual companies;85
and Delaware and Oregon have amended their trust law to

ISSUES INTO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 13 (2005); see also Schanzenbach &
Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 389.
81 An influential study in 2003 by Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew
Metrick gave considerable credibility to the claim that governance factors
did influence firm performance. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishiii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 114–29
(2003); see also Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters
in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 785 (2009) (constructing
an “entrenchment index” and finding that increases in this index of six governance features were associated with significant reductions in firm value).
The debate over indexes has continued and been robust, but both sides believe governance matters.
82 The Freshfields opinion noted earlier is one example. UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIVE, supra note 80, at 13.
83 See id.; Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary
Duties and ESG Integration, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 731, 734–36 (2019).
84 Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 387 (citing Signatory Directory, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., [https://perma.cc/R66R-72LU]
(last visited Dec. 22, 2019) (click “View/Download File”)). Of these 1,900, the
majority were European asset managers, showing the greater acceptance of
ESG investing in Europe. See id. at 387 n.15.
85 Id. at 387.
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specifically address and facilitate ESG investing.86 Even the
major index funds, including BlackRock and Vanguard, which
ordinarily ignore firm-specific factors as “indexed investors,”
are now actively focused on some ESG issues (such as climate
change) and seeking to impose changes on firms in their portfolio.87

B. The Remaining Legal Uncertainty
Still, problems persist. Although the law in Europe has
been sufficiently revised and clarified to make ESG investing
appear safe for even the most risk-averse trustee,88 U.S. fiduciary law in most states still imposes a “sole interest” rule that
instructs the fiduciary to consider only the interests of the
beneficiary (and thus not to give weight to the interest of others, including, the billions who may be affected by adverse climate change).89 Of course, the “rebranding” of ESG some fifteen years ago was designed to show that ESG, as revised,
could improve risk-adjusted returns, thus satisfying a hardnosed economic test even without giving weight to collateral
benefits to others. Some scholars buy this argument and
86 In 2018, Delaware amended its trust law to authorize ESG investing
if it is authorized in the trust instrument. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §
3303(a)(4) (2021); see also OR. REV. STAT. §§ 130.020(2), 130.755(3)(i) (2021).
87 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 387–88. For example,
BlackRock’s Larry Fink’s letter to corporate CEOs asking for “net zero”
emissions by 2050 is an example of a strong intervention by a diversified
investor. See Fink, supra note 47.
88 European regulators have generally accepted and encouraged ESG
investing. See Press Release, Eur. Ins. & Occupational Pensions Auth., EIOPA Issues Opinions on Governance and Risk Management of Pension
Funds (July 10, 2019), https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/content/eiopa-issuesopinions-governance-and-risk-management-pension-funds_en
[https://perma.cc/M3YG-TFT3] (urging national regulatory authorities
within the EU to “encourage pension funds to consider the impact of their
long-term investment decisions and activities on ESG factors”); see also
Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 387.
89 The “sole interest” rule applies to fiduciaries under private trusts, at
ERISA plans, and at charitable foundations, but does not normally apply to
the directors or officers of mutual funds or hedge funds (unless they are
serving as advisors to an ERISA plan). See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra
note 14, at 400–01.
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consider ESG to no longer be controversial,90 but others continue to have doubts. Most notably, Professors Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff have drawn a sharp distinction
between (1) ESG investing based on moral or ethical reasons
or to achieve various collateral benefits (such as, I suppose,
saving the Earth), and (2) ESG investing intended to improve
risk-adjusted returns.91
This distinction between (in their words) “collateral benefit” ESG investing and “risk-return” ESG investing92 seemingly makes everything depend on the fiduciary’s motive. Realists will, of course, recognize that, once risk-averse
fiduciaries are properly advised as to the law, they likely will
express the legally proper motive and deny the legally improper motive. (Hey folks, isn’t that what lawyers are for?)
Thus, under this approach, the practical risk of fiduciary liability seems relatively small.
Still, the test proposed by Schanzenbach and Sitkoff would
actually require considerably more than just a proper motive.
They would require the prudent trustee to conclude, before investing based on any special ESG factor, that the “capital markets consistently misprice the factor in a predictable manner
that can be exploited net of any trading and diversification
costs.”93 Although this test purports to permit ESG investing,
it may well be a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Its very demanding
standard about mispricing may be much harder for ERISA fiduciaries to satisfy. In effect, the fiduciary must determine,
first, that ESG factors relate to firm performance in the case
of a specific company and, second, that this factor has been

90 See Gary, supra note 83, at 799–800. Professor Gary served as the
Reporter for the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act,
which alone makes her a significant voice in this field. The Principles for
Responsible Investment represents probably the leading statement of the
necessity for fiduciaries to adopt ESG factors into their investment analysis.
It has obtained over 1,900 asset manager endorsements of its statement of
principles. See supra note 84.
91 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 385–86.
92 For their use of this terminology, see id. at 389.
93 Id. at 451.
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sufficiently mispriced so that the fiduciary can exploit this
mispricing (net of trading and diversification costs).94
Although I agree with them that ESG investing is not mandatory and that prudent trustees can reasonably conclude
that they cannot outperform the market (as the Supreme
Court has also observed in a relevant recent decision),95 the
possibility still seems remote that any court, either state or
federal, would second guess and hold liable trustees who do
decide to engage in ESG investing in the belief that it will enable them to achieve a superior portfolio. Courts are not suspicious of professional trustees, and, absent a personal selfinterest on the part of the fiduciary, they have little reason to
apply any enhanced scrutiny standard. Nor is there any clear
history of courts intervening in this private world to impose
liability.
In fairness, the “sole interest” rule regulates only some institutional investors (principally ERISA plans, common-law
trusts, and charitable foundations) and does not apply to mutual funds or hedge funds, which are subject to SEC regulation. Still, pension funds account for nearly half of the assets
held by institutional investors,96 and asset managers, including BlackRock, advise them. Thus, the “sole interest” rule (and
particularly a Department of Labor rule extending it)97 may
reduce the size of the coalitions that can form to take collective
action on ESG issues.

C. The Impact of a Portfolio-Wide Perspective
What is the best way out of this quandary? Here, we need
to recognize that the key development is the new high level of
94
95

Id. at 390–91, 450–53.
See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 426–27

(2014).
96 In 2018, U.S. pension funds held about $22.7 trillion in assets, approximately forty-one percent of all assets held by U.S. investment funds,
pension funds, and insurance companies. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV.,
OECD INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STATISTICS 173 tbl.1 (2020) (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/financeand-investment/oecd-institutional-investors-statistics-2020_9a827fb7-en.
97 See infra Section IV.D.
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common ownership that enables diversified institutional investors to take collective action on a portfolio-wide basis. Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff do not discuss this possibility, but fiduciaries should be able to engage in ESG investing
on a portfolio-wide basis in full compliance with the “sole interest” rule so long as they make a finding that their collective
strategy should raise returns or lower risks. For example, suppose that ERISA plans were to join both mutual funds and
hedge funds in a joint effort to push the major energy companies to adopt tighter standards on emissions and to advance
the date on which they become carbon neutral. Their justification might be that, although this would reduce the financial
returns for some portfolio companies (i.e., coal companies), it
would benefit other companies (i.e., those who produced solar
power, wind power or nuclear power). Such pressure was in
fact successfully applied to Royal Dutch Shell and others in
2018.98 Economically, such interventions would make sense—
if the losses to the traditional energy companies were outweighed by gains to the other firms in the portfolio. As Madison Condon has framed it: “A rational owner would use his
power to internalize externalities so long as its share of the
costs to the externality-creating firms are lower than the benefits that accrue to the entire portfolio from the elimination of
the externality.”99
98 In late 2018, Royal Dutch Shell was pressured by a coalition of institutional investors to set emission reduction targets to reduce its carbon footprint by twenty percent by 2035 and fifty percent by 2050. See Condon, supra note 8, at 2. It had previously opposed these targets and described them
as “onerous and cumbersome,” but once approached by this institutional coalition, it yielded quickly. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Sarah Kent, Shell to Link Carbon Emissions Targets to Executive Pay, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2018) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/shell-to-link-carbon-emissions-targets-to-executives-pay-1543843441). Thereafter, this same coalition next approached
ExxonMobil, Chevron, and BP. Id. at 3.
99 Id. at 6. Professor Condon provides us with a well-reasoned hypothetical. Assume, she argues, that BlackRock believed it could cause Exxon
and Chevron to reduce their carbon emissions by forty percent at the cost of
a twenty percent decline in each of their stock prices. Id. at 45. On this assumption, she calculates that the stock price decline to BlackRock at these
two companies would total $6.3 billion, but that the gain for the rest of their
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In the past, even a large institutional investor could not
hope to cause a shift in corporate policy at a portfolio firm.100
But in the new age, where the Big Three usually represents
twenty-five percent of the shares voted just by themselves101
(and can reach out to their fellow institutions for more support), they seem able to enforce their will effectively. Moreover, the firm managers that they will seek to pressure are typically risk-averse and probably reluctant to jeopardize their
careers by engaging in a contested proxy fight with these powerful institutions.
Of course, fiduciaries at an ERISA plan would have to
make an informed judgment and compare the costs and benefits from recommended action to their portfolio. But this is exactly where consultants will predictably be hired to perform
such an analysis.102 Possibly my cynicism is showing, but
these consultants will usually be able to justify the requisite
findings that their clients want. Indeed, this could become a

portfolios would be $9.7 billion, thus producing a substantial net gain. Id.
at 45–47. If institutional investors are satisfied with her calculations, they
should eagerly pursue such a policy.
100 As Professors Bebchuk and Hirst record, institutional ownership
and its concentration have increased rapidly in recent decades. See Bebchuk
& Hirst, supra note 8, at 724–27.
101 Id. at 724.
102 For example, an environmental consulting firm, an accounting firm,
or a proxy advisor might compare the loss to a major oil company (such as
Royal Dutch Shell in our earlier example) from reducing its emissions or
carbon footprint by a specified percentage to the benefits to other companies
in its portfolio from achieving reduced pollution and postponing adverse climate change. Some asset managers appear to be making these estimates
already. Schroders, a major asset manager, has calculated that a four degree increase (Centigrade) would produce “global economic losses” of $23
trillion over an eighty-year period. See Condon, supra note 8, at 6 (quoting
Schroders Climate Dashboard Points to Four Degree Rise—Despite Increase
in
Carbon
Prices,
SCHRODERS
(Oct.
19,
2018),
https://www.schroders.com/en/au/institutions/insights/investment-insights/schroders-climate-dashboard-points-to-four-degree-rise—despite-increase-in-carbon-prices/ [https://perma.cc/NE73-78JJ]). Because this is a
short Article, it will simply assert (and not demonstrate) that such calculations are difficult and tend to be error-prone.
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burgeoning growth business for accounting firms, proxy advisory firms, and other consultants.
This is also the juncture where the SEC could play a useful
role. The SEC could require corporate managers to disclose
data that they possess about the costs of change (for example,
the costs of reaching carbon neutrality by a given date). Such
data (which increasingly exist at many large public companies) could be required to be disclosed in the firm’s Management Discussion & Analysis (MD&A).103 This would not be an
aggressive step for the SEC, as it would only be requiring the
disclosure of data in management’s possession and not mandating any position on ESG investing.
Conceivably, one could go even a step further: fiduciaries
might also calculate the benefits to their beneficiaries, as individuals, from reducing pollution or slowing climate
change.104 Although under ERISA fiduciaries may be legally
103 “Reporting companies,” which include most exchange-listed companies, must comply with SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1–.1406
(2020), by filing certain mandatory periodic disclosures with the SEC. Item
303 of Regulation S-K (“Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations”) requires such a reporting company to
“[i]dentify any known trends or any known demands, commitments, events
or uncertainties . . . that are reasonably likely” to produce material changes
in the issuer’s liquidity, capital resources, or results of operations. Id. §
229.303(b)(1)(i). If there were even “uncertainties” about the costs of reaching environmental targets and those costs could have a material impact on
liquidity, capital resources, or results of operations, then disclosure would
be required. The point here is that the SEC could clarify that such disclosure
was required as to major ESG topics, such as climate change, and this would
inform and motivate fiduciaries at the major institutional investors.
104 This idea that fiduciaries could serve the best interests of their beneficiaries by considering more than simply the impact of their actions on the
individual stocks before them will worry some, as it could quickly lead down
a slippery slope to very subjective judgments. For example, one could look
even beyond the financial interest of the beneficiaries and add into the calculation their personal interests as well: reducing pollution may enable the
beneficiaries to live longer or better lives. Heretical as this may sound, two
distinguished economists have endorsed such a test, arguing that fiduciaries should maximize not stock value, but shareholder welfare. See Oliver
Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare
Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247, 248–50 (2017). By contrast,
ERISA’s “sole interest” rule appears to require fiduciaries to focus solely on
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required to focus on the financial benefits to their beneficiaries, it may be possible to quantify those financial benefits on
a portfolio-wide basis. Considering the personal financial benefits to investors (i.e., benefits unrelated to the stock price,
such as reduced health care costs) would be much more controversial, but the Department of Labor’s rule could be modified to permit fiduciaries more discretion and still comply with
ERISA’s statutory language. Again, consultants could give fiduciaries detailed estimates based on legitimate studies.
The bottom line here is that trustees who reach a careful,
informed position based on legitimate data are unlikely to face
any serious risk of liability. What such prudent trustees most
need is more information—in particular, information that enables them to make comparisons between companies. To illustrate, suppose the SEC encouraged companies to express information in terms of estimated benchmarks. For example, by
what date did the company believe it would become “carbon
neutral”? At what cost? Many companies have already released projected dates (2040, 2050, etc.)105 Other companies
have remained silent, but if a hypothetical company were to
have such an estimated date (which it had never publicly disclosed), the SEC should make clear that this information is in
its view presumptively material (as would be any similar estimate of the costs involved in meeting this target date). If such
disclosure of internally generated estimates were required in
the MD&A,106 this information would also carry very little
risk of liability under federal securities laws.107
“financial benefits” (not personal benefits) to the beneficiaries. See Fifth
Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 420–21 (2014) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (2014)). Still, outside of ERISA, a broader calculation of the benefit that combines financial and personal benefits might
be possible.
105 General Motors, for example, expects to be carbon neutral by 2040.
See Neal E. Boudette & Coral Davenport, G.M. Phasing out Cars and Trucks
Using Gas by 2035, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2021, at A1.
106 Again, this is Item 303 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303,
which is usually referred to as the “MD&A.”
107 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides in its section 21E
(“Application of Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements”) that reporting companies (with some modest exclusions) do not have liability for
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Already, many securities analysts prepare rankings of
public companies in terms of ESG criteria. The problem with
such rankings is a familiar one: “Garbage In, Garbage Out”—
the “GIGO Effect.” Today, ESG disclosure is incomplete and
unstandardized, with rankings that are dubious and inconsistent.108 Public disclosure of ESG data would, at a minimum, improve the quality of such rankings and ratings and
give trustees greater confidence in relying on such data. The
bottom line here is that more ESG data will likely produce
more decisions based on ESG criteria—and also greater attention to systematic risk.

D. Investment Versus Voting Decisions
Proponents of the “sole interest” rule tend to overlook the
differences between voting and investment decisions. Historically, they have been viewed differently by both ERISA and
the SEC. Although the “sole interest” rule may apply to both,
a critical difference is that both the Department of Labor and
the SEC have long required fiduciaries to vote the shares held
by their funds, on the theory that voting rights are an asset
belonging to the fund and should not be wasted.109 Both
forward-looking statements that prove false if the statement is “accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements” that explain some of the “factors
that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (2019).
108 ESG ratings often disagree, and mutual funds that emphasize their
focus on ESG often score below non-ESG funds when subjected to objective
review based on their own criteria. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note
14, at 431.
109 The position of the Department of Labor (which administers ERISA)
dates back to the famous “Avon Letter” of 1988. See Letter from Alan D.
Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., to Helmuth Fandl,
Chairman, Ret. Bd., Avon Prods., 1988 WL 897696 (Feb. 23, 1988). This
letter expressed the Labor Department’s view that fiduciaries had to exercise their voting powers and vote shares; it was later codified in a 1994 Interpretive Bulletin issued by the Department of Labor. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.942(3) (2008). This bulletin expressed the view that “[a]ctive monitoring and
communication” with corporate management “is consistent with a fiduciary’s obligations under ERISA where the responsible fiduciary concludes
that there is a reasonable expectation that such [activities] . . . [are] likely
to enhance the value of the plan’s investment in the corporation, after
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agencies also recognized that voting has low costs (in contrast
to investment decisions)110 and that fiduciaries must constantly make voting decisions across their portfolios. As a result, both favored a rule of reason with regard to voting and
shareholder activism for many years.111
Then, in December 2020, in the concluding days of the
Trump Administration, the Department of Labor dropped a
bombshell, reversing its prior approach to shareholder activism. No longer endorsing mandatory voting of shares and
dropping the prior “reasonable expectation” test, it proposed a
rule under which a fiduciary subject to ERISA “must not vote
taking into account the costs involved.” Id.; see also Paul Rissman & Diana
Kearney, Rise of the Shadow ESG Regulators: Investment Advisers, Sustainability Accounting, and Their Effects on Corporate Social Responsibility, 49
ENV’T L. REP. 10155, 10168 (2019).
The SEC followed several years later and similarly endorsed the duty of
a fiduciary or investment advisor to vote the shares held by a mutual fund
or other investment company. See Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2,106, 2003 WL 215467, at *2 (Jan.
31, 2003). To sum up, both agencies agree that fiduciaries must vote their
shares and must do so with the objective of increasing the value of the fund
to their beneficiaries.
110 See, e.g., Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including
Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 81 Fed. Reg. 95,879, 95,881 (Dec. 29,
2016). This revised bulletin adopted a “reasonable expectation” standard for
when fiduciaries should engage in shareholder activism, with the expectation being that the plan’s assets would be enhanced. Id. at 95,881, 85,884.
However, in December 2020, the Department of Labor withdrew the bulletin and adopted a new final rule that significantly changed the standard for
voting decisions to require that an ERISA fiduciary believe that voting
shares in a particular case would enhance firm value. See infra at notes
111–112 and accompanying text.
111 Even under President Trump, the Department of Labor continued
to use a “reasonable expectation” standard until the final days of the Trump
Administration. Although it cautioned that the objective of shareholder activism must be the enhancement of the plan’s value (meaning that the fiduciary may not be pursuing political or social preferences), it did not alter
significantly prior Department of Labor positions. See Memorandum from
John J. Canary, Dir. of Reguls. & Interpretations, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Lab., to Mabel Capolongo, Dir. of Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Lab.
& Reg’l Dirs. 4–5 (Apr. 23, 2018). However, this position changed dramatically in December 2020, as explained in the text and infra note 112.
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any proxy unless the fiduciary prudently determines that the
matter being voted upon would have an economic impact on
the plan.”112 Ultimately, it watered down this position slightly
by permitting fiduciaries to use a “principles-based” approach
that allowed them to consider the general tendencies of a particular type of vote (i.e., did it generally increase share value,
without the need for individualized determination).113 Nonetheless, this still implied that a prerequisite to voting by an
ERISA fiduciary was a prior determination (whether individualized or generalized) by the fiduciary that the vote would
have a positive economic impact on the plan; a “no impact”
determination still implied that the shares should not be
voted.114 This is a rule of enforced passivity, which goes well
beyond simply precluding votes based on moral or ethical considerations.
Consider what this does to ERISA plans that tend to vote
affirmatively on ESG measures. Hypothetically, suppose that
an ERISA plan would like to vote in favor of a shareholder
proposal requiring greater diversity on the board. Assume the
plan has no research or other proof that plans benefit generally from such votes. Is it now barred from voting on this
112 See Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder
Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 81,658, 81,687 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509,
2550) (Dec. 16, 2020). This rule became effective on January 15, 2021, just
days before the end of President Trump’s term. Id. at 81,695. Before adopting this proposal on shareholder voting under ERISA, the Department of
Labor a month earlier adopted a similarly restrictive rule on investments
by an ERISA plan under ERISA’s “exclusive benefit” rule. See Financial
Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846, 72,848 (Nov.
13, 2020) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2550) (instructing fiduciaries that
they “may not subordinate return or increase risks to promote non-pecuniary objectives”). This provision was somewhat less surprising than the later
rule on shareholder voting because investments do involve greater costs and
risks. Both may be re-examined by the Biden Administration.
113 See Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder
Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. at 81,694–95.
114 The Department of Labor eliminated the “must not vote” language
from its original proposal, but its final rule is similar in effect: fiduciaries
must vote or abstain from voting on the basis of financial benefit to the plan,
and the safe harbor for a voting decision requires at least a generalized determination as to effect. See id. at 81,663, 81,694–95.
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precatory (and largely aspirational) measure? Must it find
such evidence or conduct a potentially expensive study first
(one whose outcome is not automatically obvious)? Must it
show that the market has “mispriced” this special factor?115
Even as revised, the Department of Labor’s new rule does
seem to place a costly hurdle before such votes, and it quickly
attracted a firestorm of criticism.116
Three basic arguments call into question the legitimacy of
this rule. First, voting is different from an investment or sales
decision in that (1) loss of diversification benefits is less
threatened by voting (whereas such benefits were threatened
when investors sold off stocks of South Africa-based companies in the 1980s), (2) the transaction costs of a voting decision
are trivial (no brokerage fee is involved and no sale proceeds
have to be re-invested), and (3) the failure to vote can also result in loss to shareholders. That is, shareholders may suffer
losses as much from the inability to vote as from “bad” voting
decisions.
Second, an ERISA fiduciary can make a voting decision on
a portfolio-wide basis, and the rule should apply differently in
these cases to reflect the prospect of gain. Sometimes (as in
the case of climate change votes), the fiduciary may be able to
net out the gains and losses across its portfolio and find that
a positive financial result from the vote is likely. Other times
(such as in cases involving race or gender issues), the fiduciary
may believe that a market wide shift toward board diversity

115 This is the position taken by Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff.
See supra notes notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
116 See, e.g., Kurt N. Schacht, The Labor Department Is Tearing Down
a Landmark of Investor Protection, BARRON’S, (Sept. 11, 2020, 7:30 AM),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-labor-department-is-tearing-down-alandmark-of-investor-protection-51599823800
[https://perma.cc/NJV2LQQH]; Brian Croce, Proxy Proposal Angers Institutions, PENSIONS & INVS.
(Sept. 7, 2020, 12:00 AM) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review),
https://www.pionline.com/regulation/proxy-proposal-angers-institutions;
Peter Rasmussen, ERISA Voting Proposal Would Limit ESG Factor Use,
BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 10, 2020, 4:38 PM) (on file with the Columbia Business
Law
Review),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-erisa-proxy-voting-proposal-would-limit-esg-factor-use.
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would yield positive gains, but it would be too costly to conduct
the requisite studies.117
Third, some states have amended their “sole interest” rules
to recognize and permit ESG investing,118 but the Department
of Labor’s rule may now preempt such inconsistent state rules.
Traditionally, federal agencies (particularly in Republican administrations) have been cautious about preempting state law
in the belief that, in a federal system, states should be entitled
to experiment and respond to local conditions and circumstances.119
Nonetheless, without explanation or justification, the new
Department of Labor rule seems to preempt inconsistent state
rules. In response, the Biden Administration moved quickly to
announce in March 2021 that it would not enforce the Trump
Administration’s rules on ESG investing and ESG voting.120
That is a good start, but more specific guidance needs to be
given.121
117 An elaborate literature exists concluding that investments in Corporate Social Responsibility” (or “CSR”) do increase firm value modestly and
do reduce systematic risk. See, e.g., Rui Albuquerque, Yrjö Koskinen &
Chendi Zhang, Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Risk: Theory and
Empirical Evidence, 65 MGMT. SCI. 4451, 4457–63 (2019).
118 See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing statutes in
Delaware and Oregon).
119 On conservative worries about preemption and the steady increase
of preemptive laws, see generally John Kincaid, Foreword, The New Federalism Context of the New Judicial Federalism, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 913 (1995).
But see Bradley W. Joondeph, The Partisan Dimensions of Federal Preemption in the United States Courts of Appeals, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 223, 225
(finding Republican judges more likely than Democratic judges to favor
preemption in difficult cases).
120 On March 10, 2021, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Employee Benefits Security Administration issued an enforcement policy statement indicating that it would not enforce either the ESG investment rule or the ESG
voting rule adopted in the last weeks of the Trump Administration. See Michael Albano, Mary E. Alcock, Alexander Kurtz & Francesca M. Crooks,
Cleary Gottlieb Discusses DOL’s Declining To Enforce Rules on ERISA Plan
Investments and Proxy Voting, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar. 23, 2021)
(summarizing a law firm memorandum).
121 Even if these rules are not enforced by the DOL, they could still
have some residual effect, which might lead a court to deem them to
preempt arguably inconsistent state law rules. Also, it is conceivable (but
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E. The Coming Controversy over Portfolio-Wide
Decisionmaking
The vision that portfolio-wide voting by institutional investors could reduce externalities has excited scholars.122 Viewed
in economic terms, this is a relatively conservative idea because it does not involve fiduciaries subordinating economic
returns to social welfare (as the proponents of “stakeholder
capitalism” sometimes demand). Rather, fiduciaries are
simply seeking to improve returns and reduce risk by responding to systematic risks that could depress the entire economy.
Nonetheless, it will likely arouse more controversy than
modest concessions to stakeholders. Consider this hypothetical: five diversified index funds threaten a proxy contest to
replace at least some of the directors of Smoky Coal Corp., unless it agrees to comply promptly with certain environmental
restrictions. Fearing a proxy contest and their ouster, Smoky
Coal’s management induces its board to agree to the restrictions and to appoint a partial slate of directors nominated
by the index funds. On the announcement of this decision,
Smoky Coal’s stock price falls ten percent, and Smoky Coal’s
management closes its principal mine in Kentucky, with a resulting large lay-off of miners. Employees are outraged, and a
prominent senator from Kentucky schedules a senatorial committee hearing on the “arrogance” of the index funds.
Contemporaneously, the state legislature in Kentucky begins to draft legislation that would cancel the environmental
unlikely) that a private cause of action could be asserted by shareholders or
others based on these rules. Affirmative guidance from DOL, not silence, is
needed on ESG voting.
122 This idea that common ownership will lead rational investors in a
common portfolio to seek to minimize externalities probably originates with
Robert G. Hansen and John R. Lott, Jr. See Robert G. Hansen & John R.
Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a world With Diversified
Shareholder/Consumers, 31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 43, 46–49
(1996); see also Robert H. Gordon, Do Publicly-Traded Corporations Act in
the Public Interest?, ADVANCES IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, June 12, 2003, at
1, 6. But these authors wrote before the actual appearance of large-scale
common ownership. Recent interest in this topic has likely been provoked
by Madison Condon. See Condon, supra note 8.
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changes just adopted, and corporate law firms develop a new
form of poison pill that would bar the acquisition of more than
ten percent of a Kentucky company’s stock by any group of
mutual funds that is seeking (or later seeks) to pass or support
specified shareholder resolutions.
The point here is not that this reaction will succeed, but
that counter-pressure is predictable. Although I suspect that
the threat of such political retaliation will incline many institutional investors toward no more than reticent participation
in attempts to curb externalities through collective action,
time will tell. At present, the Big Three have learned to “talk
the talk,” but it is still unclear whether they will “walk the
walk” (that is, take collective action). Collective action to maximize portfolio value requires a leader that the index funds
can follow (because they are reluctant to initiate contests). In
other contexts, activist hedge funds have played this role and
the passive giant investors have followed, but in the context
of a systematic risk campaign, hedge funds are unlikely to be
able to play the same role.123

V. CONCLUSION
Briefly and bluntly, this Article has offered five initial conclusions:
(1) Institutional investors logically have a greater interest in systematic risk than do undiversified investors (in part because only diversified investors
with high common ownership can take effective action), and much of what ESG disclosures would provide relates primarily to systematic risk.
(2) Individual investors (at least if undiversified) have
reason to fear that portfolio-wide voting by diversified institutions may adversely affect them. Today,

123 Hedge funds hold too small and undiversified a portfolio to be able
to profit from campaigns seeking to curb negative externalities because they
do not hold a sufficient volume of securities to incur gains that on a net basis
outweigh the losses to the target firm. Basically, only index funds have the
scale to profit from such netting. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying
text (discussing the scale of index funds).
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they are not adequately advised about the conflicts
that arise between their interests and those of both
diversified institutional investors and activist
hedge funds.
(3) Because of the high level of common ownership
among diversified institutional investors, these investors can potentially profit on a portfolio-wide basis by taking actions that seek to reduce externalities. But again, this aggravates the conflict between
diversified and retail investors.
(4) Because ESG disclosures and high common ownership enable diversified institutions to make decisions on a portfolio-wide basis and potentially reduce systematic risk, the advent of portfolio-wide
decisionmaking (both as to investments and voting)
may represent the most important contemporary
change in institutional investor behavior. Although
it appears to be logically consistent with the “sole
interest” rule, it will provoke continuing controversy.
(5) There is little need for a federal “sole interest” rule.
No claim has been made that the states have failed
to enforce their rules. Absent a showing that state
law has failed or cannot be enforced, a federal rule
is undesirable, as it may preempt sensible variations at the state level.
This Article has not asserted that fiduciaries must favor
ESG investing. Decisions to engage or not to engage in ESG
investing should both be protected. The real issues for the future are: (1) whether the Trump Administration’s efforts to
chill ESG voting decisions (and thus, by extension, ESG investing) should be reversed; and (2) whether institutional investors are prepared to face significant political controversy
and pushback if they pursue portfolio-wide voting policies.124
124 It is not just institutional investors who are under attack, nor
simply the Department of Labor that is leading this campaign. In 2020, possibly in response to their activism in assisting institutional investors, proxy
advisors were subjected to new and burdensome SEC rules that will slow
the process by which they can advise and assist their clients. See generally
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For the SEC, this transition may force it to redefine itself.
Since its creation, it has been an agency committed to serving
“stock-picking” individual investors.125 Such investors are,
however, fading from the scene. This does not mean they
should be ignored, but that greater attention must be given to
the majority of individual shareholders who are now diversified (and often indexed).
Common ownership has both an upside and a downside,
and to date little scholarly attention has focused on the upside. Shareholders have not been regarded as the “true owners” of the corporation since Berle and Means announced the
separation of ownership and control many decades ago.126 Yet
today, shareholders have regained the powers of “true owners.” Unlike their nineteenth century antecedents (for example, the railroad, oil and bank barons), the focus of institutional investors, as owners, will logically shift to maximizing
portfolio value, not the value of individual stocks. One implication of this transition is that it may solve a problem that has
frustrated legal scholars for decades. Over that period, many
scholars have sought to find a strategy to make public corporations behave more virtuously.127 Despite their gallant efforts, they have not fully persuaded most of us, and more conservative scholars have responded that reducing the
Michael Cappucci, The Proxy War Against Proxy Advisors, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. &
BUS. 579 (2020) (analyzing the rules). My point here is only that this example may concern and caution institutional investors, who must realize that
activism can produce political retaliation in their cases as well. To be sure,
the major institutional investors have much greater financial resources
than the proxy advisors.
125 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
126 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 120 (Macmillan 1933) (1932).
127 For a partial list, see, for example, generally Cynthia A. Williams,
The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999); KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF
CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES
(2006); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH (2012); Einer Elhauge,
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733
(2005); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachtler, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010). This list is far from
exhaustive but includes books and articles that I considered highly original.
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externalities associated with corporate behavior is not the job
of corporate law.128 Now, without any change in corporate law,
at least a possibility has arisen that institutional activism can
curb externalities and lead to a better (and not just more profitable) society.
Ultimately, one final conclusion needs to be stressed: in an
era of high common ownership and institutional sensitivity to
systematic risk, disclosure gains impact and power that it
never had before. In the past, disclosure could trigger governmental interventions, private litigation, or reputational injury, but today disclosure is becoming self-enforcing, as shareholders can take dispositive action on their own. Yes, this is
optimistic, and change may come more slowly. Questions remain as to how hard diversified funds will push managements, how the high costs of activism can be best shared, and
who will organize and lead systematic risk campaigns that are
likely to reduce the stock price of the target company.129 These
issues should constitute the near term research agenda for legal academics.

128 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 439 (2001) (arguing that shareholder
wealth maximization is the goal of corporate law); Michael C. Jensen, Value
Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function,
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2010, at 32, 32–33, 35 (arguing that the regulation of externalities falls within the government’s function and is not a
task that boards should pursue).
129 Chiefly, these problems surround who can be induced to lead a strategic risk campaign, given that the index funds are likely to remain reticent
participants and that activist hedge funds are less likely to profit from such
campaigns that reduce the target stock price. I am focusing on these issues
in another article.

